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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

:

Plaintiff/Appellant,

:

v.

:

TRACY MANUEL VALDEZ,

:

Defendant/Appellee.

Case No. 20010772-CA

:

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT OFFICER'S CONCERN
FOR THEIR SAFETY DID NOT JUSTIFY INITIATION OF A LEVEL
TWO ENCOUNTER
At Point III of his brief, defendant asserts, as an alternative claim, that the officer
safety exception did not justify initiating a level two encounter. Aple. Br. at 12-14. In
support, defendant particularly cites State v. Warren, 2001 UT App 346, 37 P.3d 270
(attached at Addendum A).
The State respectfully suggests that Warren is doubtful authority in support of
defendant's claim. Defendant cites Warren for the basic propositionfromOhio v. Terry that
'" [w]here a police officer validly stops an individual for investigatory or other purposes and
reasonably believes that the individual may be armed and dangerous, the officer may
conduct a "frisk" or "pat-down" search of the individual to discover weapons that might be
used against him.'" Aple. Br. at 12 (quoting Warren, 2001 UT App 346, at f 13 (emphasis

in original) (quoting State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656,659 (Utah 1985))).1 Thereafter, defendant
repeatedly cites Warren. Aple Br. at 12-13. He first recites the rubric that "a mere
unparticularized suspicion or hunch is not sufficient [to establish^! reasonable suspicion]."
Aple. Br. at 12 (quoting Warren, 2001 UT App 346, atf 14) (citation omitted). Defendant
then refers to Warren's delineation of two basic scenarios that may warrant a frisk, seizing
on the first to develop his argument that there was an insufficient basis to believe that
defendant might be armed. Aple. Br. at 13 (quoting Warren, 2001 UT App 346, at ^[15 ("In
the first [scenario], facts and circumstances unique to the particular suspect and/or factual
context may give rise to a reasonable suspicion the suspect may be armed[.]")).2
The State, of course, does not dispute these basic propositions. However, defendant's
repeated reference to Warren directly invokes the spirit of that case. As stated, the State
respectfully suggests that Warren is doubtful authority in support of defendant's claim. In
Warren, a police officer validly stopped a driver for a traffic violation after having observed
the driver engaged in a brief conversation with another man at 4:45 a.m. in a deserted
downtown area of Salt Lake City. Id. at ff2-4. Obtaining the driver's license, the officer
noted that it had expired four years earlier. Id. at ^[2, 4. The driver asserted that he had a
current license, but that it had been stolen. Id. at f4. After inquiring about the driver's

1

See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,92 S. Ct. 1868 (1968).

2

The State has fully treated the reasonableness of the officers' belief that
defendant might be armed and their minimal intrusion to confirm or dispel that belief
throughout the argument in it's opening brief. See Aplt. Br. at 7-27.
2

purpose in being in that area at that time and about the other man's identity, the officer
checked the driver's license and learned that although it was current it had been suspended.
Id. atffl[5-6. The officer then directed the driver out of the car, apparently only to inform the
driver that the car would be impounded and without intending to arrest him. Id. at ^6.
However, when the driver exited the car, the officer conducted afrisk,during which a white
plastic "twist," later identified as cocaine, fellfromthe driver's waist, and he was arrested.
7</.atf7.
Before trial, the defendant in Warren moved to suppress the discovery of the cocaine
on the ground that the frisk was not justified by a reasonable belief that he was armed. Id.
at ^[8. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the frisk was justified by the
officer's legitimate concern for his safety. Id.
On appeal, this Court reversed the trial court's ruling. Id. at f 16. The Court
particularly noted that at the suppression hearing the officer testified that he did not believe
the defendant was armed when hefriskedhim. Id. The Court also found unpersuasive the
State's arguments that the frisk was justified by the lateness of the hour, defendant's lying
about his driver's license, and the inherent dangerousness of traffic stops. Id. atffl[12,16.
Warren is substantially distinguishablefromthis case. First, the trial court implicitly
recognized that the situation justified the officers' concerns for their safety at the outset of
their encounter with defendant (R. 52, 54). As argued throughout the State's opening brief,
see Aplt. Br. at 7-27, nothing in the officers' subsequent encounter with defendant alleviated

3

those concerns. Indeed, the officers discovered almost immediately after asking defendant
to show his hands that he was lying about his identity, all in the midst of what was probably
a felony arrest in which defendant was acting suspiciously.
More importantly, the State respectfully contends that Warren expresses a somewhat
depreciated view of the dangers confronted by police officers in their line of duty. Following
this Court's reversal of the trial court's suppression ruling, the State petitioned for writ of
certiorari on the narrow issue of whether this Court failed to apply, under the totality of the
circumstances, governing law concerning the inherent dangerousness of traffic stops. Pet.
at 1. The Utah Supreme Court has granted the State's petition. See Order, dated April 10,
2002 (attached at Addendum B).3 While the narrow issue before the supreme court does not
directly bear on the facts of this case, the general issue of officer safety presented is
extremely relevant to the disposition of this case. As argued at length in the State's opening
brief, the officers' concern for their safety was justified at the outset and never abated, all in
circumstances suggesting at least as great an objective concern for safety as those in Warren.

3

As of current date, the State has filed its opening brief in State v. Warren, No.
20020002-SC.
4

CONCLUSION
Given the factual distinctions between this case and those in Warren, and the
uncertainty of Warren's authority on the general issue of officer safety, this Court should
decline to regard Warren as significant authority for defendant's claim that the officer safety
exception did not justify initiating a level two encounter,
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Z^

day of July, 2002.

MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

KENNETH A. BRONSTON
Assistant Attorney General
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37P.3d270
434 Utah Adv. Rep. 31, 2001 UT App 346
(Cite as: 37 P3d 270)
Court of Appeals of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Eric Jarvis WARREN, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 20000495-CA.
Nov. 16,2001.
Defendant was convicted in the Third District Court,
Salt Lake County, Sheila K. McCleve, J., of possession
of a controlled substance. Defendant appealed. The
Court of Appeals, Orme, J., held that: (1) police officer
did not have any reasonable suspicion that defendant,
who was cited for traffic violations, was armed to
justify Terryfrisk,and (2) remand to trial court was not
appropriate to determine if seizure of cocaine and drug
paraphernalia from defendant was justified under
inevitable discovery exception to exclusionary rule.
Reversed and remanded.
Thorne, Jr., J., concurred in part, dissented in part, and
filed an opinion.

West Headnotes
HI Criminal Law €=>1134(3)
110k! 134(3) Most Cited Cases
HI Criminal Law €=^1153(1)
11 Okl 153(1) Most Cited Cases
HI Criminal Law €=>1158(4)
110k! 158(4) Most Cited Cases
The factual findings underlying a trial court's decision
to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence are
reviewed under the deferential clearly- erroneous
standard, and the legal conclusions are reviewed for
correctness, with a measure of discretion given to the
trial judge's application of the legal standard to the
facts.
121 Arrest €=>63.5(8)
35k63.5(8) Most Cited Cases
Where a police officer validly stops an individual for
investigatory or other purposes and reasonably believes
Copr. ® West 2002 No Claim

that the individual may be armed and dangerous, the
officer may conduct a frisk or pat-down search of the
individual to discover weapons that might be used
against him. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
131 Arrest €=^63.5(8)
35k63.5(8) Most Cited Cases
Although it is not essential that an officer actually have
been in fear to perform a Terry frisk, the State must
present articulable facts that would reasonably lead an
objective officer to conclude that the suspect may be
armed; a mere unparticularized suspicion or hunch is
not sufficient. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
1 £ Arrest 0=>63.5(8)
35k63.5(8) Most Cited Cases
Facts and circumstances unique to the particular suspect
and/or factual contextmay give rise to a reasonable
suspicion the suspect may be armed to warrant a Terry
frisk, such as a suspect with a bulge in his clothing that
appears to be a weapon or a suspect who is hesitant in
denying that he is armed and aggressively approaches
the officer immediately upon being stopped. U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 4.
151 Arrest €=*63.5(8)
35k63.5(8) Most Cited Cases
If the inherent nature of the crime being investigated
leads an officer to a reasonable suspicion that a suspect
may be armed, a Terry frisk may be warranted.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
1 £ Arrest €=^63.5(8)
35k63.5(8) Most Cited Cases
Only where there is a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity and the nature of the crime suggests an
increased likelihood that the suspect is armed can a
frisk be justified. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
121 Automobiles €=^349.5(10)
48Ak349.5(10) Most Cited Cases
Police officer did not have any reasonable suspicion
that defendant, who was cited for traffic violations, was
armed to justify Terry frisk, where officer testified at
suppression hearing that he did not believe defendant
was armed at time he decided to frisk defendant.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works

Paee 10
181 Criminal Law €==>394.1(3)
110k394.1(3) Most Cited Cases
181 Criminal Law C=>394.6(4)
110k394.6(4) Most Cited Cases
Inevitable discovery is a valid exception to the
exclusionary rule; however, under the inevitable
discovery doctrine, State has the burden to establish by
a preponderance of the evidence that the information
ultimately would have been discovered by lawful
means. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
121 Criminal Law €=>1181.5(7)
110k! 181.5(7) Most Cited Cases
Remand to trial court was not appropriate to determine
if seizure of cocaine and drug paraphernalia from
defendant was justified under inevitable discovery
exception to exclusionary rule; no evidence in record
could have sustained findings that police would have
inevitably discovered r cocaine and paraphernalia.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmendr 4.
*271 Catherine E. Lilly, Otis Sterling, III, and Heather
Johnson, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff, Atty. Gen., and Marian Decker,
Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for Appellee.

Before JACKSON. Associate P.J., and ORME and
THORNE, Jr.. JJ.

OPINION
ORME, Judge:
U 1 Appellant Eric Jarvis Warren seeks to overturn his
conviction for possession of a controlled substance, a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (SUPP.1999).
Specifically, he
contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to
suppress evidence he alleges was seized in violation of
his Fourth Amendment rights. Warren argues that the
evidence obtained from the police officer's search
should have been suppressed because, inter alia, he was
illegally frisked. The State counters with, among other
things, the claim that the evidence would inevitably
have been discovered. We reverse.

BACKGROUND
^ 2 "Because a determination of the reasonableness of
... police conduct is highly factual in nature, we review
the facts in detail." State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 86
(Utah Ct.App.1987). On November 28, 1999, at

approximately 4:45 a.m., Officer Nathan Swensen
observed a grey Cadillac pulled over to the side of the
road near the intersection of 200 South and 200 East
streets in downtown Salt Lake City. Occupying the
driver's seat of that vehicle was appellant Warren, a
thirty-eight year old African-American male. Officer
Swensen also observed another unidentified individual
leaning into thefrontpassenger's side door of Warren's
car.
f 3 Officer Swensen observed this activity for less than
a minute, did not hear any of the conversation that took
place, could not tell what the two people were doing,
and did not recognize the vehicle or individuals from
prior encounters.
Nonetheless, Officer Swensen
assumed that Warren and the unidentified individual
were engaged in a transaction involving either drugs or
prostitution. Officer Swensen testified that he based
his suspicion on the fact that it was early in the morning
and there were no open businesses or residences in the
vicinity. Despite his suspicions, Officer Swensen did
not then approach Warren's vehicle or the unidentified
man, who departed on foot.
f 4 Officer Swensen then observed Warren pull away
from the curb and make a left turn onto 200 South,
followed by a lane change, without signaling. Officer
Swensen pulled Warren over after observing the traffic
violation. He requested Warren's driver's license and
vehicle registration. Warren readily provided the
requested materials. Officer Swensen noticed that the
license had expired in 1995. Warren explained that he
had a current license, but that it had been stolen.
f 5 Officer Swensen then set about to ascertain why
Warren was out at that time of night and what he had
been doing with the unidentified man. He asked
questions regarding who the unidentified man was, what
they were doing, and whether Warren had dropped the
man off or just met him. Warren responded by telling
Officer Swensen that his mother and the man's mother
were acquaintances and that he dropped the man off
after they had been together at someone's house.
Warren also indicated that he had been looking for
packing boxes for his sister, who was moving. Officer
Swensen's questioning lasted approximately two
minutes. Officer Swensen conceded at the suppression
hearing that these questions were unrelated to and
unnecessary for the proper effectuation of the traffic
stop.
*272 If 6 Officer Swensen returned to his patrol car,
checked Warren's license, and learned that it was
otherwise current but had been suspended for failure to
pay reinstatement fees. Officer Swensen then decided
to impound Warren's car. He asked Warren to get out

Copr. © West 2002 No Claim to Ong. U.S. Govt. Works
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of the car to sign citations for failure to signal and for
driving without a valid license. Officer Swensen
testified he did not intend to arrest Warren and only had
him exit the vehicle to inform him about the impound
and to sign the citations.

standard, and the legal conclusions are reviewed for
correctness, with a measure of discretion given to the
trial judge's application of the legal standard to the
facts." State v. Moreno. 910 P.2d 1245, 1247 (Utah
ClApp.), cert denied, 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996).

% 7 When Warren was out of the car, Officer Swensen
frisked him. He did not believe that Warren was armed
or dangerous, but frisked him as a matter of routine.
fFNll A white plastic "twist," later identified as
cocaine, fell from Warren's waist during the frisk,
whereupon Warren was arrested. An inventory search
of Warren's car uncovered a knife concealed under the
armrest, and a more in-depth search of Warren's person,
incident to arrest, led to the discovery of more cocaine
and a glass pipe.

^111 The State argues that even if the actions of Officer
Swensen violated Warren's Fourth Amendment rights,
the case should be remanded to the trial court to
determine if the evidence acquired from the
investigation should nonetheless be admitted because it
would inevitably have been discovered.

FN1. In fact, when asked, the officer testified
that his reasons for thefriskwere "(j]ust from
training, and for my safety, and everybody that
was there, their safety. Whenever I pull
somebody out of a car, I perform a Terry frisk
just to see if there's weapons. Also because of
the fact that with there being drug activity and
prostitution and so on, people that are
involved in that usually carry weapons. So
with that in mind, also for the fact that I
always do that, perform that Terryfriskwhen
I pull somebody out of a car, that's why I did
it."

f 8 Warren moved to suppress the cocaine and pipe as
evidence, claiming (1) that the scope of the detention
and questioning went beyond the purpose of the traffic
stop and (2) that the frisk was not justified by a
reasonable suspicion that he was armed. The trial
court denied the motion, concluding that the
questioning was reasonable given the officer's personal
observations and resulting suspicion. The court also
ruled that the frisk was justified by the officer's
legitimate concern for his safety.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
f 9 The issues presented in this appeal are whether the
trial court, in denying appellant's motion to suppress,
correctly determined that (1) Officer Swensen properly
extended the scope of the traffic stop beyond its
original purpose and (2) the officer's search of Warren
did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
j j j f 10 "The factual findings underlying a trial court's
decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence
are reviewed under the deferential clearly-erroneous

I. LEGALITY OF FRISK
K12 Warren argues that the evidence obtainedfromhis
person was inadmissible at trial because he was frisked
absent any reasonable suspicion that he was armed. He
points out that at the suppression hearing Officer
Swensen testified he did not believe Warren to be
armed at the time he decided to frisk him. The State
insists that Officer Swensen's search of Warren was
objectively reasonable under the Supreme Court's
decision in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1.88 S.Ct. 1868,20
L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). "[g]iven the circumstances of the
traffic stop, including the deserted downtown area at an
unusually early hour, defendant's lie about the validity
of his license, and recognition that traffic stops are
inherently dangerous." FFN21

FN2. Apparently recognizing the lack of any
articulable facts that would reasonably lead to
an inference that Warren and his acquaintance
were engaged in a drug or prostitution
transaction, the State on appeal does not
seriously press this angle as a basis for
suspecting Warren was armed.

£21K 13 The State's argument reflects a fundamental
misunderstanding of the Terry *273 holding, which is
not nearly as open-ended as the State seems to suggest.
In Terry, the Supreme Court established a narrowly
drawn exception to the Fourth Amendment
requirement that police obtain a warrant for all
searches. Where a police officer validly stops an
individual for investigatory or other purposes and
reasonably believes that the indiyidual may be armed
and dangerous, the officer may conduct a "frisk" or
"pat-down" search of the individual to discover
weapons that might be used against him.
State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 659 (Utah 1985)
(emphasis added).
[3] K 14 Although "[i]t is not essential that an officer
actually have been in fear" to perform a Terry frisk, the

Copr. © West 2002 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works

Paee
State must present articulable facts that would
reasonably lead an objective officer to conclude that the
suspect may be armed. W, "A mere unparticularized
suspicion or hunch is not sufficient." Id.
r4ir5H"61 ^ 15 Two basic scenarios may warrant a Terry
frisk. In the first, facts and circumstances unique to the
particular suspect and/or factual context may give rise
to a reasonable suspicion the suspect may be armed,
such as a suspect with a bulge in his clothing that
appears to be a weapon or a suspect who is hesitant in
denying that he is armed and aggressively approaches
the officer immediately upon being stopped. See State
v. Rochell 850 P.2d 480. 483 (Utah Ct.App.1993):
Wayne R. LaFave, 4 Search and Seizure, § 9.5(a), at
252, 257 (3rd ed.1996). In the second scenario, it is
not so much the peculiarities of the suspect and
circumstances as it is the inherent nature of the crime
being investigated that leads to the reasonable suspicion
that the suspect may be armed. The leading treatise on
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence explains that while it
may be reasonable for an officer to frisk a suspect who
has been stopped based upon a suspicion that he is
engaging in criminal activity for which an offender
would likely be armed, it does not follow that officers
are free to frisk any individual suspected of any crime.
fFN31 See Wayne R. LaFave, 4 Search and Seizure, §
9.5(a), at 254-59 (3rd ed.1996). Crimes that, by their
nature, suggest the presence of weapons include:
"robbery, burglary, rape, assault with weapons,
homicide, and dealing in large quantities of narcotics."
Id. at 255-56 (footnotes omitted). "But for other types
of crimes, such as trafficking in small quantities of
narcotics, possession of marijuana, illegal possession of
liquor, prostitution, bookmaking, shoplifting, underage
drinking, driving under the influence and lesser traffic
offenses, minor assault without weapons, or vagrancy,"
there must be particular facts which lead the officer to
believe that a suspect is armed.
Id. at 256-57
(footnotes omitted).

FN3. This court has expressed an
unwillingness to characterize a frisk as
justified where the possibility of a crime being
committed is speculative at best and the
officer's suspicions do "not generally implicate
an inherently dangerous situation or
specifically indicate that the suspect [is]
armed." State v. White, 856 P.2d 656.663-66
(Utah CtApp. 1993) (holding that "unfounded
allegations of attenuated domestic violence"
and suspicion of cocaine use did not justify an
immediate frisk). Only where there is a
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and
the nature of the crime suggests an increased

likelihood that the suspect is armed can a frisk
be justified. See id± State v. Carter. 707
P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985) (authorizing the
frisk of a burglary suspect who matched a
police radio description because an officer
could reasonably conclude that a burglary
suspect might be carrying dangerous tools or
weapons); State v. Dorsev, 731 P.2d 1085.
1092 (Utah 1986) (Zimmerman, J.,
concurring) (explaining that Terry frisk of
suspect reasonably believed to be involved in
moving large quantities of illegal drugs over
long distances was justified).

[I} % 16 Beyond his supposition that Warren and his
unidentified companion were engaging in a transaction
for either prostitution or drugs, Officer Swensen did not
provide the trial court with any facts that justified a
Terry frisk. The fact that Officer Swensen candidly
admitted at the suppression hearing that he did not
believe Warren was armed at the time he decided to
frisk him clearly takes Officer Swensen's actions
outside of Terry's limited justification for warrantless
searches. Nor do the facts urged by the State on appeal
to rationalize the frisk furnish the required foundation.
fFN41 We therefore conclude *274 that the search
violated Warren's Fourth Amendment rights, and the
evidence obtained thereby should have been
suppressed. fFN51

FN4. See f 12, supra. As noted, "lesser
traffic offenses" are not suggestive of
weapons. Wayne R. LaFave, 4 Search and
Seizure, § 9.5(a), at 256 (3rd ed.1996). Nor
is the lateness of the hour. See id. at 260.
Similarly, lying about the status of one's
driver's license does not suggest the presence
of weapons.

FN5. Having concluded that the evidence
obtained should have been suppressed due to
the unlawfiil frisk, we need not address
whether Officer Swensen also violated
Warren's rights by impermissibly extending
his questioning beyond the scope of the traffic
stop.

n. INEVITABLE DISCOVERY
£81TJ 17 The State argues that even if the search was
unlawful, this case should be remanded to the trial court
to determine if the seizure of cocaine and paraphernalia
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from Warren's person was nonetheless justified under
the "inevitable discovery" exception to the exclusionary
rule. "Inevitable discovery is a valid exception to the
exclusionary rule[.]" State v. Tooanotes. 2000 UT Ann
3115 10, 14P.3d695. However, under the inevitable
discovery doctrine, the State has the burden to "
'establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the
information ultimately would have been discovered by
lawful means/ " Id^ (quoting State v. James, 2000 UT
80516. 13 P.3d 576).
[9] J 18 In making its argument, the State correctly
points out that the trial court did not make findings of
fact addressing this issue. The State argues the trial
court should have the opportunity to do so now.
However, in so arguing the State fails to recognize that
this lack of findings relevant to inevitable discovery
was not due to some lapse or oversight by the trial
court, or even to a mistake of law. Rather, the State
failed to timely advance the theory or present evidence
to support it.
f 19 Although the State bore the burden of proving that
the evidence would inevitably have been discovered by
lawful means, not one word about inevitable discovery
was mentioned during the suppression hearing itself.
No evidence in contemplation of that theory was
introduced by the State, nor was it mentioned in the
brief oral argument that concluded the hearing. Rather,
the idea surfaced for the first time only in subsequent
briefing and a later round of oral arguments when it was
raised, with apologies for its untimeliness, by a different
prosecutor than the one who handled the actual
suppression hearing.
% 20 Moreover, there is absolutely no evidence in the
record that would sustain findings in support of a
determination that discovery of the drugs and
paraphernalia on Warren's person would have been
inevitable, along the lines theorized by the State on
appeal, even had he not been frisked. Although the
arresting officer did testify that he impounded Warren's
car, there was no testimony that, following such
impoundment, an inventory search of the vehicle would
have been made.
No testimony established the
procedure, scope, and criteria of such a search, in
accordance with preestablished departmental
guidelines, so that the legality of such a search could be
gauged. See generally State v. Shamblin, 763 P.2d
425,426-27 (Utah Ct.App. 1988). The record contains
no evidence showing that such a search would have
uncovered the knife, much less that such discovery
would have prompted further immediate contact with
Warren. There was no testimony that the officers
would have been able to quickly locate Warren after
discovering the weapon, or that he still would have had

narcotics and paraphernalia on his person at the time of
any such later encounter.
TI21 Because no evidence in the record would support
findings establishing inevitable discovery, remand
would be a meaningless gesture that should be avoided
in the interest of judicial economy. In State v. Hazen,
802 P.2d 745 (Utah Ct.App. 1990). rev'd on other
grounds, 858 P.2d 925 (Utah 1992). affd. 510 U.S.
399. 114 S.Ct. 958. 127 L.Ed.2d 252 (1994). we
explained that a remand is not appropriate where "there
is simply no way [the] evidence [can] be 'weighed' by
the trial court to come to the conclusion that the state
[has] met its burden." Id. at 747. As in Hazen. there
is no way in this case that the trial court, lacking any
relevant evidence, could properly determine that the
*275 police would have inevitably discovered the
cocaine and pipe. See id.
CONCLUSION
% 22 Because when Officer Swensen frisked Warren he
did not believe, and had no basis on which to
reasonably conclude, that Warren might be armed, the
frisk was unlawful. The evidence procured as a result
of thatfriskmust be suppressed. Further, because the
State failed to meet its burden to establish the discovery
of the evidence was inevitable, that theory has long
since been foreclosed. Remand for consideration of
that theory's applicability at this late date cannot be
justified in the complete absence of any evidence
addressing inevitable discovery. Accordingly, we
reverse and remand for a new trial or such other
proceedings as may now be appropriate.

f 23 I CONCUR: NORMAN H. JACKSON.
Associate Presiding Judge.

THORNE. Jr.. Judge (concurring in part, dissenting in
part):

f 24 I concur with the principle portion of the
majority's opinion, however, I feel that deciding the
issue of inevitable discovery at this level without
permitting the trial court the opportunity to consider it
is unwise.
% 25 I agree that the record presented to this court is
insufficient on its face to support a conclusion of
"inevitable discovery." However, I disagree with the
decision to foreclose any further examination of this
issue in the name of "judicial economy," particularly
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since, as the majority points out, it was not addressed
below. The majority seems intent on establishing an ill
conceived rule requiring the state to raise every possible
argument in response to a motion to suppress. The
majority would foreclose the possibility for additional
evidence and additional argument directed at this
specific question under the belief that the prosecution
has had an opportunity to present such an issue, but
chose not to, thereby surrendering the option to ever
raise it again.
K 26 In my experience, the question of "inevitable
discovery" is often not ripe for discussion until and
unless the trial court concludes that a violation of the
Fourth Amendment has occurred. Further, until a trial
court has reached such a conclusion, requiring such an
effort would waste valuable resources for the parties
and the trial courts.

1336. 1339 (Utah 1979).
^| 29 Accordingly, I make no judgment as to the
ultimate determination of whether the evidence in this
particular matter would have inevitably been
discovered, but I would permit the trial court to receive
additional evidence *276 and hear additional argument
on the question. Moreover, I do not believe the
majority is correct in stating that "remand would be a
meaningless gesture that should be avoided in the
interest of judicial economy." Therefore I dissent.
37 P.3d 270, 434 Utah Adv. Rep. 31, 2001 UT App
346
END OF DOCUMENT

f 27 I believe both wisdom and precedent support a
more balanced approach permitting further exploration
of questions like "inevitable discovery" after a trial
court has determined that the Fourth Amendment has
been violated. See Murray v. United States. 487 U.S.
533. 543, 108 S.Ct 2529, 2536. 101 L.Ed.2d 472
(1988) (vacating the judgment and remanding the case
for further hearings on the issue of the "independent
source" doctrine, which had not been previously
addressed); State v. Wazoner, 126 N.M. 9. 966 P.2d
176. (Ct.App. 1998) (stating "[T]he district court made
no findings, oral or written, regarding these issues.
When the prosecutor began to argue for application of
the inevitable-discovery exception, the district court cut
him off by expressing its disapproval of the exception.
Consequently, we must remand to the district court to
determine whether the inevitable discovery exception
applies to this case."), rev'd on other grounds, 130
N.M. 274. 24 P.3d 306 (Ct.App.2001). fFNll

FN1. If the trial court properly determines that
the search did not violate the Fourth
Amendment, it would be wasted effort to also
require that the court take evidence and make
findings concerning inevitable discovery at the
same time.

K 28 Moreover, I also disagree with the majority's foray
into findings of fact concerning this issue following our
admission that the record is insufficient to fully address
the issue. I believe that it is not our role to make
findings of fact, and absent a proper finding of fact
"application of the proper rule of law is difficult, if not
impossible, and the reviewing function of this court is
seriously undermined." Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d
Copr. © West 2002 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works

Addendum B

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
00O00

State of Utah,
Petitioner,
No. 20020002-SC
20000495-SC
991923384

Eric Jarvis Warren,
Respondent,

ORDER
This matter is- before the court upon a Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, filed pursuant to Rule 48, of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Writ of Certiorari
filed on January 2, 2002, by petitioner is granted.

FOR THE COURT:

/

Date

PC

1/

~)

Christine M. Durham
Chief Justice

